Autobiographical facts and personal trait knowledge are conceptualized as distinct types of personal semantics, but the cognitive and neural mechanisms that separate them remain underspecified. One distinction may be their level of specificity, with autobiographical facts reflecting idiosyncratic conceptual knowledge and personal traits representing basic level category knowledge about the self. Given the critical role of the left anterior ventrolateral temporal lobe (AVTL) in the storage and retrieval of semantic information about unique entities, we hypothesized that knowledge of autobiographical facts may depend on the integrity of this region to a greater extent than personal traits. To provide neuropsychological evidence relevant to this issue, we investigated personal semantics, semantic knowledge of non-personal unique entities, and episodic memory in two individuals with well-defined left (MK) versus right (DW) AVTL lesions. Relative to controls, MK demonstrated preserved personal trait knowledge but impaired "experience-far" (i.e., spatiotemporal independent) autobiographical fact knowledge, semantic memory for non-personal unique entities, and episodic memory. In contrast, both experience-far autobiographical facts and personal traits were spared in DW, whereas episodic memory and aspects of semantic memory for non-personal unique entities were impaired. These findings support the notion that autobiographical facts and personal traits have distinct cognitive features and neural mechanisms. They also suggest a common organizing principle for personal and non-personal semantics, namely the specificity of such knowledge to an entity, which is reflected in the contribution of the left AVTL to retrieval.
1. Introduction
Personal semantics
Much of one's autobiographical memory is composed of personal semantics, which is knowledge about the self that contextualizes experiences and adds meaning to the life story (Cermak and O'Connor, 1983; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Klein and Lax, 2010; Kopelman et al., 1989) . Despite the importance of personal semantics to one's sense of self (Addis and Tippett, 2004; Grilli, 2017; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015; Klein and Gangi, 2010; Klein et al., 2003; Klein and Lax, 2010) , how such knowledge is organized and retrieved remains underspecified. Recent studies have begun to close this gap in knowledge, showing that the retrieval of personal semantics shares cognitive and neural mechanisms with general semantic memory, which is world or culturally shared knowledge, as well as with episodic memory, which is memory for unique events Verfaellie, 2014, 2016; Renoult et al., 2016; Tanguay et al., 2018) . These findings have supported the proposal that personal semantics are organized into subtypes of knowledge that vary in their cognitive features, and accordingly the neural mechanisms that are necessary for their storage and retrieval (Renoult et al., 2012) .
evidence for a neural distinction (Klein et al., 2002; Klein and Lax, 2010; Tulving, 1993) . Also favoring this interpretation, a meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies showed that there are differences in peak activations associated with the retrieval of these two types of personal semantic memory (Martinelli et al., 2013) . Specifically, personal trait knowledge is prominently linked to medial prefrontal cortex, whereas autobiographical facts are related to more distributed activations within the autobiographical memory network, including the left anterior and lateral temporal lobe (Martinelli et al., 2013) .
In prior research to compare the neural bases of these two types of personal semantic memory, autobiographical facts have been treated as a unitary construct with a single underlying neural substrate. However, recently this idea has been challenged Verfaellie, 2014, 2016) . According to Grilli and Verfaellie, some autobiographical facts are not completely separated from the spatiotemporal context from which they were derived and therefore are episodic-like or "experiencenear" (e.g., I run on Saturdays). In contrast, "experience-far" autobiographical facts (e.g., names of my children) are devoid of any spatiotemporal context and thus are more similar to other types of conceptual knowledge. In line with this theoretical framework, a neuropsychological study found that the retrieval of experience-near autobiographical facts, but not experience-far autobiographical facts, was impaired in individuals with medial temporal lobe (MTL) amnesia (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2016) . One important implication of these findings is that treatment of autobiographical fact knowledge as a unitary type of memory may amplify differences with personal trait knowledge. Specifically, prior neuropsychological studies of individuals with MTL amnesia showing that autobiographical facts and personal traits dissociate may have been driven by deficient retrieval of experience-near autobiographical facts (Klein et al., 2002; Tulving, 1993) . Indeed, there have been no previous attempts to directly compare experience-far autobiographical facts and personal traits in individuals with neurological damage. As such, it is unclear whether the relative differences in regional brain activation for autobiographical facts (broadly defined) and personal traits documented in neuroimaging studies (Martinelli et al., 2013 ) reflect a genuine dissociation between the neural substrates of experience-far autobiographical facts and personal traits specifically.
Based on the experience-near versus experience-far framework, it is unclear what, if anything, separates experience-far autobiographical facts from personal trait knowledge at a cognitive and neural level. On the one hand, experience-far autobiographical facts and personal traits are similar in that they can be viewed as conceptual forms of autobiographical memory, with the majority of their features overlapping with general semantics more than episodic memory. From this perspective, these two types of personal semantic knowledge may rely on similar neural mechanisms for storage and retrieval. On the other hand, despite both being conceptual, experience-far autobiographical facts and personal traits appear to vary in regard to the level of specificity at which they represent knowledge about the self. Experience-far autobiographical facts can be considered fairly idiosyncratic; they capture knowledge of a particular entity that is personally known, including people, places, and objects (e.g. name of first employer, favorite subject in high school). Personal traits, in comparison, can be thought of as more basic or general attributes of the self, because they are abstract and stable, and they can cut across multiple contexts involving different people, places, and activities (e.g., being curious is not usually specific to one social relationship, place, or time) (Conway, 2005; Grilli, 2017) . Indeed, some models propose that personal trait knowledge is extracted from autobiographical facts and episodic memories, providing a higherorder level of organization of autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005; Klein and Lax, 2010) . From this perspective, relative to personal trait knowledge, experience-far autobiographical facts may be more dependent on neural mechanisms that are necessary for retrieving specific attributes of an entity.
Contribution of the left anterior ventrolateral temporal lobe to nonpersonal and personal semantics
Personal semantics are believed to share some cognitive and neural mechanisms with general semantics (Renoult et al., 2012) . Therefore, it is noteworthy that in the domain of general semantics, the left anterior ventrolateral temporal lobe (AVTL) is thought to be particularly critical for the retrieval of semantic attributes that are highly specific to singular entities (e.g., knowing a famous person's name or the name of a landmark) (Abel et al., 2015; Ross and Olson, 2012; Tranel, 2006 Tranel, , 2009 . For instance, left AVTL damage secondary to focal lesions or semantic dementia has been associated with impaired retrieval of specific names as well as subordinate categorization of non-personal unique entities and concepts, with basic level category knowledge in the general semantic domain usually relatively spared (Lambon Ralph et al., 2012; Tranel, 2006 Tranel, , 2009 Rogers et al., 2015; Patterson et al., 2007) , or not correlated with lesions to the AVTL (Damasio et al., 1996) . Similar results have been found in individuals with temporal lobe epilepsy (Benke et al., 2013) . Functional neuroimaging studies have also associated the processing of familiar faces and buildings with the left AVTL in particular (Grabowski et al., 2001; Gorno-Tempini and Price, 2001; Brambati et al., 2010; Ross and Olson, 2012) , whereas retrieving semantic information that reflects intermediate or basic level category knowledge (e.g. classifying an object as a bird/dog or an animal/vehicle) has been associated with activation that extends from the AVTL to more posterior cortical regions (Rogers et al., 2006) . Therefore, if experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge and personal trait knowledge are organized by their specificity, they may differ in the extent to which they depend on the left AVTL for storage and retrieval, similar to the differential involvement of this brain region in the retrieval of unique versus non-unique knowledge in the general semantic domain.
Although numerous neuropsychological studies have shown that individuals with lesions to the left AVTL often have impaired autobiographical fact knowledge (Graham and Hodges, 1997; Herfurth et al., 2010; Hodges et al., 1992; Ivanoiu et al., 2006; Nestor et al., 2002; Philippi et al., 2015) , the contribution of this region to experience-far facts is unclear. Notably, most studies have not separated experience-far from experience-near facts, and they have investigated individuals with semantic dementia and temporal lobe epilepsy/lobectomy, two populations in which lesions to the MTL are not uncommon. As such, it is difficult to know if impaired retrieval of experience-near facts has confounded the apparent relation of autobiographical fact retrieval to the left AVTL. Grilli and Verfaellie (2016) found that the generation of experience-far autobiographical facts in an open-ended narrative task was numerically reduced in two individuals with lesions extending from the medial to lateral temporal lobes, but the discrepancy from controls was not statistically significant. In fact, studies that have isolated experience-far autobiographical facts and found significant impairment have relied on retrieval fluency (Lah et al., 2004; Piolino et al., 2003) , which can be globally disrupted by AVTL lesions (Martin et al., 1990) . Therefore, the contribution of the left AVTL to experience-far autobiographical facts may be clarified by using a direct, non-fluency based assay of this type of knowledge.
Unlike autobiographical fact knowledge, few neuropsychological studies have investigated the storage and retrieval of personal trait knowledge in individuals with AVTL damage. Although Duval and colleagues (Duval et al., 2012) demonstrated that individuals with semantic dementia can generate core identity statements, the integrity of personal trait knowledge was not directly assessed. Tulving (Tulving, 1993) reported that amnesic patient K.C. could reliably and accurately judge his personal traits, but K.C. also demonstrated temporally-graded impairment of autobiographical fact knowledge (Rosenbaum et al., 2005) . Thus K.C.'s lesions to the lateral temporal lobes, which were relatively minimal (Rosenbaum et al., 2005) , may not have been extensive enough to severely disrupt either type of memory. Therefore, whether damage to the left AVTL can impair the retrieval of personal trait knowledge is not known.
Present study
The goal of the present study was to directly compare, for the first time, experience-far autobiographical fact and personal trait knowledge in individuals with well-defined and largely complementary focal lesion to the left or right AVTL. In particular, we wanted to determine whether specificity of knowledge distinguishes these two types of personal semantic memory at the neural level, providing evidence for their functional distinctiveness postulated by cognitive models of autobiographical memory (Conway, 2005; Klein and Lax, 2010; Renoult et al., 2012) . In addition, we wanted to obtain neuropsychological evidence relevant to the hypothesis that the left AVTL may serve a common organizing function for both personal and non-personal (i.e., general) semantics. To assess experience-far autobiographical facts, we derived a sub-score from the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI; Kopelman et al., 1989) , focusing on the questions that required retrieval of names of people and buildings, as such content is considered to be devoid of spatiotemporal context and thus experience-far (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2016) . Consistent with prior studies (Klein and Lax, 2010; Tulving, 1993) , to assess personal trait knowledge, we measured the reliability of the participants' ratings of their personality characteristics, and in a follow-up, we assessed accuracy of trait knowledge in one of the temporal lobe lesion participants. 1 We separated the AMI sub-score and personal trait rating task into retrograde and anterograde components. Whereas the retrograde components could provide insight into the role of the left AVTL in the retrieval of consolidated personal semantics, the anterograde components could illuminate the importance of this brain region to the storage of new personal knowledge.
To assess the degree of overlap in the contribution of the AVTL to general semantics and personal semantics and to investigate the influence of levels of specificity in both domains, we also included experimental measures of retrograde semantic memory for non-personal unique entities (i.e., famous people and places). Notably, the temporal lobe participants were given multiple tests of basic level category knowledge as part of a comprehensive neuropsychological evaluation completed before this study, and they demonstrated largely normal performance. Finally, to provide a broader context, we also assessed retrograde and anterograde episodic memory with the AMI. We hypothesized that if experience-far autobiographical facts and personal trait knowledge are organized according to their specificity to a particular entity, this cognitive feature would be reflected in the impact of AVTL damage to their storage and retrieval. In other words, the left AVTL may serve a domain-general role in the retrieval of personal and non-personal specific knowledge, in which case both experience-far autobiographical facts and specific attributes of non-personal semantic knowledge would be impaired in the left temporal lobe participant. In contrast, personal trait knowledge may be a basic level form of personal knowledge and largely spared in the left temporal lobe participant, similar to basic level category knowledge in the general semantic domain. However, if experience-far autobiographical facts and personal traits are not organized according to their specificity, left AVTL damage would presumably affect both types of memory equally. We also acknowledged that the right AVTL may play a role for personal semantics, given evidence that impaired autobiographical fact knowledge has been associated with damage to right lateral temporal lobe regions (Herfurth et al., 2010; Philippi et al., 2015) . However, we hypothesized that personal semantic and general semantic impairments would be more severe in the participant with left lateralized lesions relative to the participant with right lateralized lesions, given that functional neuroimaging and neuropsychological findings indicate that both personal semantics and semantics of non-personal unique entities are associated with left lateralized regions of the temporal lobe more than corresponding regions on the right (Brambati et al., 2010; Grabowski et al., 2001; Martinelli et al., 2013; Herfurth et al., 2010; Tranel, 2009 ).
Methods
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at University of Arizona.
Participants

Temporal lobe participants
MK was a 51-year old male when he participated in this study. He was diagnosed with temporal lobe epilepsy (complex partial type) at the age of eight, at which time he was placed on anti-seizure medication. His medication regimen successfully controlled his epilepsy throughout his childhood and early adulthood. He attended regular classrooms without difficulty and went on to complete a master's degree in computer engineering (i.e., 18 years of education). He then worked in computer technology until 2013, when he developed generalized tonic-clonic seizures, the onset of which was localized to the left MTL. In 2013, MK underwent left anterior temporal lobe surgical resection. MK reported mild to moderate changes in memory post-surgery. Although he lives semi-independently with his spouse, he was not able to return to his previous position of employment, despite initially attempting to do so. As a result, he retired and enjoys working in his garden and walking for exercise.
DW was a 48-year old female when she participated in this study. In 2013, she was diagnosed with a right temporal meningioma after sudden onset of severe headaches. She underwent an emergent neurosurgical resection without complications. She reported moderate to severe memory problems post-surgery, which affected her ability to manage daily responsibilities. Prior to her memory impairment, DW lived independently and worked as a police officer. Her performance in grade school was average, and she completed three years of a bachelor's degree in law enforcement (i.e., 15 years of education). She currently lives in an assisted living facility, requiring support for activities of daily living, including meals and transportation.
Coronal images in radiologic view from clinical MRI scans for MK and DW are presented in Fig. 1 . Examination of MK's scan revealed that his surgical procedure resulted in damage to the most anterior 3.5 cm of the left ventrolateral and medial temporal lobe. The tissue loss/encephalomalacia is extensive and extends caudally and medially from the temporal pole and includes superior, middle, and inferior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, perirhinal and entorhinal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala, and the anterior portion of the hippocampus. The superior temporal gyrus is partially spared. DW's scan revealed that her surgical procedure resulted in lesions to the right temporal lobe extending caudally 5.5 cm from the temporal pole and medially, with extensive tissue loss/encephalomalacia in the superior, middle, and inferior temporal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, perirhinal and entorhinal cortex, and parahippocampal gyrus. The amygdala and hippocampus appear to be partially spared but are essentially disconnected from entorhinal/parahippocampal regions. The superior temporal gyrus also appears to be partly spared. Notes: ss = scaled score; z = z-score; std = standard score; WAIS-IV = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 4th Edition (Wechsler, 2008) ; WMS-IV = Wechsler Memory Scale 4th Edition (Wechsler, 2009) ; Normative scores for Boston Naming Test and animal fluency were taken from Heaton and colleagues (Heaton et al., 2004) . The Cambridge Naming Test norms are based on a group of middle-aged adults from our research group.
fluency. MK's raw score of 51 on the Boston Naming Test was mildly impaired for his age and education level. However, he correctly named 5 of the 9 missed items when given a phonemic cue. Moreover, for 3 of his errors, prior to cueing he provided answers suggesting preserved superordinate semantic knowledge (e.g., "harmonica" for accordion).
To develop a more complete picture of his naming ability, he also was given the Cambridge Naming Test (Adlam et al., 2010) , which probes knowledge of several living (birds, mammals, fruits) and non-living (household objects, transportation, tools) categories. On this test, he only missed one point, and was well within normal limits. Together, his confrontation naming scores suggest that basic level category knowledge of living and non-living things was largely spared. Consistent with this interpretation, his performance on animal fluency was within normal limits. DW was given the same basic level category knowledge tests. As shown in Table 1 , her performance was within normal limits for all of these tests.
Controls
Ten healthy individuals (6 females and 4 males) matched to MK and DW on age (M = 54.8, SD = 7.2) and education (M = 16.9, SD = 0.99) also participated, p's > .10. These individuals did not have remarkable medical or psychiatric histories, and they scored within normal limits on a mental status screen (Montreal Cognitive Assessment; Nasreddine et al., 2005) .
Methods and procedures
Personal semantics
Experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge was assessed with the AMI. The AMI measures autobiographical fact knowledge with what is referred to as the "Personal Semantic Schedule," which is similar to an interview about the names of people and places, addresses, and other factual knowledge from childhood, adulthood, and recent life. Although the questions in the Personal Semantic Schedule were not originally categorized as experience-near or experience-far, we used the conceptual framework and scoring protocol of Grilli and Verfaellie (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2016) to identify questions that were clearly experiencefar. We identified 30 such questions, all of which assessed knowledge of names for people and buildings that were part of one's personal history.
2 The experience-far autobiographical fact score was separated into retrograde (childhood and adulthood, n = 20) and anterograde (recent life, n = 10) components. Although the recent life period allows participants to recall semantics from up to 5 years ago for a few questions, for all participants we restricted responses to 2013-2016, since this reflected the post-incident (anterograde) period for both temporal lobe lesion participants. Consistent with the AMI manual, accuracy of responses was not confirmed. Therefore, correct responses reflect answers that are consistent with the autobiographical content being targeted. In accordance with prior studies, we assessed consistency of selfdescriptiveness judgments of traits to measure personal trait knowledge (Klein and Lax, 2010; Marquine et al., 2016; Tulving, 1993) . This task required judging 84 personality traits on a 4-point scale (1 = not at all; 4 = definitely) on 2 occasions spaced approximately 1 week apart (session 1 and session 2). The questionnaire consisted of words selected from a pool of normalized personality trait adjectives (Anderson, 1968) . Half of the traits in the questionnaire were positive and half were negative, which was defined on the distribution of the normative ratings (i.e., first 252 were positive, 253-555 were negative). To assess both retrograde and anterograde knowledge in the temporal lobe participants, these individuals completed two versions of the rating measure, separated by approximately one month. In one version, the temporal lobe participants were asked to judge the personality traits on the basis of their personality before surgery (i.e., retrograde). In the other version, they were asked to judge the personality traits on the basis of their present personality (i.e., anterograde). The controls only completed the latter version of the trait rating task. Consistency of participants' personal trait knowledge was calculated with one-way intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs), single measure, between the first and second ratings of participants' self-ratings (i.e., between session 1 and session 2).
As described in the results, MK exhibited a discrepancy in the retrieval of experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge and personal trait knowledge. To more completely understand this difference and address interpretative issues and potential limitations associated with using trait consistency as the only measure (e.g., the possibility that a person makes judgments on the basis of social desirability or prototypical characteristics, or the concern that one's trait judgments may be consistent but not accurate), we conducted a follow-up assessment in which we evaluated the accuracy of MK's personal trait knowledge. MK's wife, who has known him for over 20 years, completed the personality trait questionnaire for his personality characteristics before and after his surgery. Accuracy of his personal trait knowledge was calculated with two-way mixed ICCs, absolute agreement, between the ratings of MK in session 1 and session 2 of both retrograde and anterograde versions of the questionnaire and his wife's ratings of him before and after surgery.
Retrograde semantic memory for non-personal unique entities
We included three measures of retrograde semantic memory for specific attributes of non-personal unique entities. Similar to our measure of experience-far autobiographical facts, these tests assessed knowledge of names or other specific attributes of people and places. One was a "famous places" test, which depicted scenic views of 40 world landmarks (e.g., Eifel Tower, Machu Picchu) and required participants to name the landmark or its location. The second was a "famous faces" test, which consisted of headshots of 40 individuals from politics and entertainment in the United States (e.g., Bill Clinton, Stephen Colbert). Participants were required to generate the name associated with the face, or provide other identity-specific information about the individual. Whereas the famous places and famous faces tests required that only a single specific associate was retrieved, to be more consistent with the Personal Semantic Schedule of the AMI, we also assessed access to multiple facts related to a single non-personal unique entity with a "famous person knowledge" test. This test required participants to retrieve facts about people (e.g., spouse or children), living locations, and other life experiences for four individuals: President Barack Obama, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Paul McCartney, and Michael Jackson. We selected these four individuals because both MK and DW were able to identify them by name and profession on the basis of headshot photographs. Six facts were assessed per non-personal unique entity for a total score of 24 facts.
Episodic autobiographical memory
We used the AMI to measure episodic autobiographical memory. The AMI measures episodic memory with what is referred to as the "Autobiographical Incident Schedule," which requires participants to retrieve three episodic memories from childhood, adulthood, and recent life (total of nine memories). Each memory receives a score of 0-3 on the basis of spatiotemporal specificity, with a maximum total score of 27. The AMI scores were separated into retrograde (childhood and adulthood, n = 18) and anterograde (recent life, n = 9) components. 2 We determined that 6 points on the AMI are clearly experience-near (e.g., place where one married). However, the remaining 27 points cannot be definitively categorized as experience-near or experience-far, because they depend on personal life contexts (e.g., one's address after marriage could be experience-near if marriage marked a move/life change, or it can be experience-far if one lived at the same address for years before and after marriage).
Analyses
MK's and DW's scores were compared to control participants with Bayesian single-case and dissociation methods (Crawford and Garthwaite, 2007; Crawford et al., 2010) . Effect size for the difference between the temporal lobe participant and controls is calculated as zscores with a 95% confidence interval (CI).
Results
Retrograde personal semantics
As shown in Fig. 2 ("Experience-Far Autobiographical Facts" and "Personality Trait Consistency"), there were both similarities and dissociations in the retrograde personal semantic memory profiles of MK and DW. In comparison to the controls, experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge was impaired for MK, p = .0001, z = −6.8 (CI: −10.0 to −3.7), but it was within normal limits for DW, p = .40, z = −0.9 (CI: −1.6 to −0.2). However, personal trait knowledge consistency was highly reliable and well within normal limits for both MK, p = .71, z = 0.4 (CI: −0.3 to 1.0), and DW, p = .41, z = 0.9 (CI: 0.1-1.6).
Retrograde semantic memory for specific attributes of non-personal unique entities
Assessment of semantic memory for specific attributes of nonpersonal unique entities also revealed similarities and dissociations between MK and DW (Fig. 2 , "Non-Personal Unique Knowledge"). Relative to the controls, MK exhibited significant impairment in the retrieval of knowledge of famous faces, p = .0001, z = −6.6 (CI: −9.6 to −3.5), famous places, p = .0008, z = −5.2 (CI: −7.6 to 2.8), and for the retrieval of facts about famous people, p = .000009, z = −9.4 (CI: −13.7 to −5.1). In comparison, DW's only impairment relative to the controls was in famous places, p = .02, z = −3.0 (CI: −4.6 to −1.5); DW was within normal limits for famous faces, p = .37, z = 1.0 (CI: 0.2-1.7), and for facts about famous people, p = .65, z = 0.5 (CI: −0.2 to 1.1).
Retrograde episodic autobiographical memory
Relative to the control group, retrograde episodic autobiographical memory was impaired for both MK, p = .03, z = −2.6 (CI: −4.0 to −1.3), and DW, p = .0002, z = −6.3 (CI: −9.2 to −3.4) (Fig. 2 , "Episodic Memory").
Anterograde personal semantics
As shown in Fig. 2 ("Experience-Far Autobiographical Facts" and "Personality Trait Consistency"), anterograde personal semantic memory performance followed a similar pattern as the retrograde domain for MK and DW. MK's retrieval of anterograde experience-far autobiographical facts was impaired, p = .007, z = −3.7 (CI: −5.4 to Fig. 2 . Performance of the temporal lobe participants and controls across tests of experience-far autobiographical facts, personal trait knowledge consistency, nonpersonal unique knowledge, episodic memory, and personality traits endorsed. Raw data for each participant (temporal lobe participants' scores are labeled with MK or DW) are shown with violin plots, which capture the distribution of the data from the control participants on each test. Across all plots, the temporal lobe participants' retrograde scores are depicted with square symbols and their anterograde scores are shown with triangle symbols. −1.9), which is not surprising given his performance in the retrograde domain. Unlike MK but also similar to her performance in the retrograde domain, DW's retrieval of anterograde experience-far autobiographical facts was within normal limits in comparison to the control group, p = .55, z = 0.6 (CI: −0.1 to 1.3). As was the case in the retrograde domain, both temporal lobe participants were highly reliable and within normal limits in comparison to the controls in their personal trait ratings: MK, p = .78, z = 0.3 (CI: −0.3 to 0.9), and DW, p = .47, z = 0.8 (CI: 0.1-1.5).
It is possible that both temporal lobe participants were reliable in their personality trait ratings for the anterograde domain, because they rated themselves the same as they did in the retrograde domain. To investigate this idea, we asked MK and DW to report whether they believed that their personality has changed since surgery on a 5-point scale (1 = very much the same; 2 = mostly the same, 3 = slightly the same, 4 = mostly different, and 5 = very much different). MK reported that his current personality was mostly the same as before his surgery, whereas DW reported that her personality was very much the same. To assess whether their ratings corresponded to these subjective judgments, we compared the first ratings from the retrograde domain to the second ratings in the anterograde domain for each temporal lobe participant. Reliability was high in both MK (ICC = 0.75) and DW (ICC = 0.84).
Anterograde episodic autobiographical memory
Relative to the controls, anterograde episodic autobiographical memory was impaired in both MK, p = .0003, z = −5.9 (CI: −8.7 to −3.2), and DW, p = .00001, z = −9.0 (CI: −13.2 to −4.9) (Fig. 2 , "Episodic Memory"), which is not surprising given their retrograde performances.
3.6. Follow-up assessment 3.6.1. Personal trait knowledge accuracy
Comparison of MK's ratings of himself with his wife's ratings of him demonstrated that he was accurate in rating his retrograde personal trait knowledge (ICC = 0.86 for session 1 and 0.87 for session 2) and his anterograde personal trait knowledge (ICC = 0.77 for session 1 and 0.83 for session 2). We also asked MK's wife whether she believed his personality has changed since his surgery, and she provided the same answer as MK (i.e., he is mostly the same).
Personality trait positivity bias
To further evaluate the integrity of personal trait knowledge in MK and DW, we investigated whether they showed a normal positivity bias, which is the tendency to endorse positive traits at a higher rate than negative traits. As shown in Fig. 2 ("Personality Traits Endorsed"), both participants and controls endorsed positive traits more than negative traits. For retrograde ratings, MK and DW did not differ from the controls for the number of positive or negative traits endorsed at either session, p's ⩾ .12. Similarly, for anterograde ratings, MK and DW did not differ for the number of positive traits endorsed at either session, or for the number of negative traits endorsed at session 2, p's ⩾ .31. However, both MK and DW endorsed fewer negative traits relative to controls at session 1 (MK: p = .02; z = −3.0, CI: -4.45 to -1.48; DW: p = .04; z = −2.6, CI: -3.89 to -1.24), indicating that they exhibited magnified positivity biases in the anterograde domain.
Additional personal semantic interview with MK
The magnitude of MK's impaired experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge was particularly striking in the context of his spared personal trait knowledge retrieval. It also appeared that, in comparison to the controls, retrograde episodic autobiographical memory was less severely impaired than retrograde experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge in MK, given the confidence intervals of the magnitude of his impairments. To assess this further, we conducted a Bayesian test on the difference between MK's scores on these two autobiographical memory tests (Crawford et al., 2010) . Retrograde experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge was more severely impaired relative to retrograde episodic autobiographical memory, p = .03, z = −3.7. In contrast, there was not a strong dissociation between these two types of autobiographical memory in the anterograde domain, p = .32, z = −1.5, although MK's near floor performance for anterograde facts limited the power of this analysis.
To further evaluate the stability of MK's impaired retrieval of experience-far autobiographical facts, we re-administered the Personal Semantic Schedule from the AMI to him one month after the initial evaluation was completed. Interestingly, he received the exact same score on the re-admission, providing "I don't know" responses to the same questions as he did initially. In many instances, MK exhibited awareness of the unusualness of his lack of autobiographical fact knowledge. Below is an exchange between the experimenter and MK that captures both the severity of his memory impairment and his insight.
MDG: Can you tell me your wife's maiden name? MK: (long pause) It is not coming to mind. Gosh, if she knew that… MDG: I asked you that question a few weeks back, and you couldn't recall at that time either. Does that surprise you? MK: Well, I know that I knew it at one point (laughs). I just haven't had to use it in a long time, probably since we got married.
[…] MDG: Where did you live after you married? MK: It is too confusing to figure out. (long pause) I just cannot remember. When you ask these questions I feel lost in my own memories. It just doesn't seem to make sense.
Discussion
Experience-far autobiographical facts and personal trait knowledge
We found that an individual with damage to the left AVTL, but not an individual with damage to the right AVTL, exhibited disrupted retrieval of experience-far autobiographical facts. In MK, both retrograde and anterograde autobiographical fact knowledge was compromised, indicating that this disruption was not isolated to new learning, but rather also affected retrieval of remote facts about his life. It is important to note that MK's MTL lesion may have contributed to his impaired anterograde fact memory, given that regions of the MTL (including the anterior hippocampus) are believed to support the acquisition of new knowledge (Moscovitch et al., 2016; Poppenk et al., 2013) . However, the findings from Grilli and Verfaellie (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2016) indicate that the retrieval of experience-far autobiographical facts, once consolidated, are not affected in individuals with isolated MTL damage. This argues against the notion that MK's impaired retrograde experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge could reflect MTL damage and suggests instead that the deficit was attributable to the extension of the lesion into the AVTL. This conclusion is bolstered by evidence from the general semantic domain that knowledge acquired in the years immediately preceding onset of amnesia is spared and independent of the MTL (Verfaellie et al., 1995) . Therefore, the retrograde findings are consistent with the idea that experience-far autobiographical facts represent idiosyncratic knowledge about personally known entities that depends on the left AVTL for retrieval. They also align with prior neuropsychological evidence that autobiographical fact knowledge, broadly defined, is more left than right lateralized (Herfurth et al., 2010 , but also see Philippi et al., 2015) .
Despite a profound impairment of experience-far autobiographical facts, MK demonstrated reliable ratings of his retrograde personal trait knowledge, as did DW. Both individuals also showed the typical positivity bias in their ratings of their retrograde personality characteristics. Although trait consistency is informative, triangulation from an independent rater is important for assuring that such ratings are truly reflective of one's personality, as opposed to judgments made on the basis of assumed social desirability. In other words, although weak memory traces for personal trait knowledge may lead to inconsistent ratings (Marquine et al., 2016) , other social factors or general knowledge (i.e., what most people are like) could rescue performance. In this regard, it is critical that we also determined through a follow-up assessment that MK's retrograde personal trait knowledge was accurate. This accuracy data corroborates the consistency findings and indicates that MK's access to such knowledge is largely spared. Given that we could not obtain accuracy ratings for DW, we acknowledge that some doubt remains about the role of the right AVTL for personal trait knowledge. Nonetheless, the autobiographical fact and personal trait knowledge findings from MK support theoretical models that separate these two types of personal semantic memory (Klein and Lax, 2010; Renoult et al., 2012) . For both MK and DW, personal trait knowledge retrieval was reliable when they were asked to complete the personality trait rating task for their personality after surgery. Importantly, our accuracy assessment of MK's ratings supports the notion that he was in fact judging his personality as opposed to giving desirable or prototypical responses. However, we hesitate to conclude that the left or right AVTL are not essential for updating personal trait knowledge. Critically, MK and DW reported minimal change in personality, and consistent with their subjective reports, their ratings across the retrograde and anterograde domain were reliable. Therefore, minimal updating of their personal trait knowledge may have been required. In line with this idea, MK's wife agreed that his personality has not changed much. Interestingly, there was one discrepancy between the temporal lobe participants and controls: their positivity biases were magnified in the anterograde domain, with both individuals endorsing fewer negative traits. That being said, it is not obvious that this reflects a compromised ability to update trait knowledge, since it is driven by a reduction in endorsing traits as self-descriptive.
On the basis of MK's findings, along with recent work Verfaellie, 2014, 2016; Marquine et al., 2016; Martinelli et al., 2013) , we propose that personal semantic memory can be viewed as consisting of subtypes of content that place distinct computational demands on regions in the autobiographical memory network. Autobiographical facts can be bound to events (experience-near), in which case they are supported by bilateral MTL structures (perhaps in particular, the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex). Or, they can be associated with personally known people, places, and objects (experience-far) and critically depend on the left AVTL (for a related viewpoint, Ranganath and Ritchey, 2012; Reagh and Ranganath, in press ). In contrast, personal trait knowledge represents categorical knowledge about the self that is extracted from facts and events and is supported by neural regions that are implicated in basic level categorical knowledge or schema-like knowledge, including, but perhaps not limited to, the medial prefrontal cortex (Marquine et al., 2016) .
The left AVTL: evidence for a shared mechanism of personal and general semantics
In addition to demonstrating defective knowledge of experience-far autobiographical facts, MK was also impaired in the retrieval of unique semantic knowledge of famous places and people. These results, therefore, can be viewed as additional support for the notion that personal semantics share cognitive and neural mechanisms with general semantics (Renoult et al., 2012) , with one point of convergence being the retrieval of experience-far semantic facts about singular entities. In other words, the personal and general semantic findings raise the possibility that the left AVTL has a central role in the retrieval of semantically unique, spatiotemporal independent knowledge, with the critical factor being level of specificity to an entity rather than semantic domain (e.g., personal vs. non-personal, living vs. non-living). In this sense, our findings are consistent with the notion that the left AVTL serves as a domain-general and modality-independent hub for semantic knowledge (Patterson et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017) . Following damage to the left AVTL, the retrieval of idiosyncratic semantic details that differentiate between individual personal and non-personal entities is lost while the ability to activate common semantic features shared with other items within the category is preserved. This leads to a specificity gradient across all semantic domains and tasks characterized by the preservation of basic level category compared to specific knowledge.
Because of the extensive neural damage in MK, we cannot determine which AVTL subregions contributed to his deficit in retrieving unique personal and non-personal semantic knowledge. We note, however, that neuroimaging studies have implicated both anterolateral and anterior ventromedial temporal lobe regions in the retrieval of specific information in the general semantic domain (Grabowski et al., 2001; Gorno-Tempini and Price, 2001; Brambati et al., 2010; Ross and Olson, 2012; Rogers et al., 2006; Tyler et al., 2004; Clarke and Tyler, 2014) . We also point out that it will be important to determine the extent to which more basic level category knowledge of the self overlaps with such knowledge in the general semantic domain. MK and DW performed largely within normal limits on neuropsychological tests of basic level general semantic knowledge, as well as personal trait knowledge. However, on the basis of this data, we cannot conclude that there is a singular neural network that supports these types of knowledge. For instance, personal trait knowledge is associated with the medial prefrontal cortex (Martinelli et al., 2013; Marquine et al., 2016) , but the role of this region in the retrieval of basic level category knowledge in the general semantic domain is unclear.
Understanding experience-far, experience-near, and episodic autobiographical contents
Although the main focus of the present study was the organization of personal semantics, additional findings from our assessment of episodic autobiographical memory are worth noting. Both DW and MK were impaired in comparison to the controls, but MK's episodic autobiographical memory was less severely impaired relative to his experience-far autobiographical fact knowledge in the retrograde domain. These findings are broadly consistent with the autobiographical memory profile linked to mild stages of semantic dementia (Hodges et al., 1992) , which is a reasonable comparison given the location of MK's lesion. On the basis of the experience-near versus experience-far framework Verfaellie, 2014, 2016) , it would be interesting to determine whether isolated damage to the left AVTL would selectively disrupt the storage and retrieval of experience-far autobiographical facts, largely sparing experience-near facts and episodic autobiographical memories. The results also are in line with the idea that subsystems of the autobiographical memory neural network may be specialized for different types of autobiographical contents (AndrewsHanna et al., 2010 (AndrewsHanna et al., , 2014 . Overall, they highlight the need for research on disorders of autobiographical memory in the context of isolated lesions and dementias, because different patterns of autobiographical memory impairment could emerge depending on the localization of lesions and progression of neurodegeneration (Irish et al., 2011 (Irish et al., , 2017 Irish and Piguet, 2013) .
Concluding remarks
In summary, recent findings from functional neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies have indicated that the cognitive and neural bases of personal semantic memory are similar to both episodic memory and general semantic memory (Grilli and Verfaellie, 2016; Renoult et al., 2012) . The results presented here suggest that specific, spatiotemporal independent knowledge of the self (i.e., experience-far autobiographical facts) depends on the left AVTL for storage and retrieval, similar to semantic memory for non-personal unique entities. Also similar to semantic memory in the non-personal domain, the left AVTL does not seem to play as critical of a role in the retrieval (and possibly updating) of basic level category knowledge about the self (i.e., personal traits). Overall, our findings support the idea that personal semantic memory is not a unitary construct but rather consists of subtypes that vary in the extent to which they rely on core neural regions of the autobiographical memory network (Renoult et al., 2012) . Furthermore, our results provide evidence for the hierarchical organization of both personal and non-personal semantics and document the greater vulnerability of specific compared to basic level category information within both domains following AVTL damage.
